T h e early sixties saw th e rise o f m ore a n d m ore schools o f th o u g h t w hich cam e to q u estion the accepted parad ig m in the philosophy o f science from the 1920's, i.e. logical positivism . W h at sta rte d as a " n o rm al" clash o f opinions, eventually developed in to , as R .F . B aum called it, th e " crisis o f the m o d ern intellect" . N o less th a n the objectivity o r ratio n ality o f scientific know ledge becam e the issue under discussion. O n the one h an d K uhn, F eyerabend, et. al. rejected the positivists' co n cep tio n o f ra tio n ality as being a red u ctio n o f the original m eaning o f hum an ratio n ality . A ccording to th e " new philo so p h y o f science" ratio n ality has been reduced to logical o r m ethodological co m p u tab ility , thereby neglecting the essen tial fa c to r o f h u m an d elib eratio n a n d ju d g em en t as the essence o f h um an ratio n al beh av iour. Logical p ositivists replied by labelling K u h n 's new em phasis on subjec tive factors in the scientific en d eav o ur as " irrationalistic" a n d ''relativistic" .
T h e early sixties saw th e rise o f m ore a n d m ore schools o f th o u g h t w hich cam e to q u estion the accepted parad ig m in the philosophy o f science from the 1920's, i.e. logical positivism . W h at sta rte d as a " n o rm al" clash o f opinions, eventually developed in to , as R .F . B aum called it, th e " crisis o f the m o d ern intellect" . N o less th a n the objectivity o r ratio n ality o f scientific know ledge becam e the issue under discussion. O n the one h an d K uhn, F eyerabend, et. al. rejected the positivists' co n cep tio n o f ra tio n ality as being a red u ctio n o f the original m eaning o f hum an ratio n ality . A ccording to th e " new philo so p h y o f science" ratio n ality has been reduced to logical o r m ethodological co m p u tab ility , thereby neglecting the essen tial fa c to r o f h u m an d elib eratio n a n d ju d g em en t as the essence o f h um an ratio n al beh av iour. Logical p ositivists replied by labelling K u h n 's new em phasis on subjec tive factors in the scientific en d eav o ur as " irrationalistic" a n d ''relativistic" .
It is therefore evident th a t co n tem p o rary clashes o f philosophies o f science culm i n ate d in th e fun d am en tal issue o f th e possibility o f reliable hum an know ledge. The C artesian ideal o f " tru e a n d certain " know ledge o r the even earlier G reek ideal of " infallible" know ledge, now becam e th e focus o f p h ilosophers o f science. It can even be said th a t th e b ro k en relatio nship betw een philosophy o f science and epistem ology, has once again been repaired.
T he m ain objective o f this article is to analyse the tw o prim ary m eanings o f ratio n ality in th e existing debate. It will be show n th a t the existing difference» in m ean in g can only tru ly b t u n d ersto o d if intei p reted as the outco m e o f the fu n d a m ental difference betw een n atu ralism (positivism ) a n d anti-natu ralism (historicism). T he aforem entioned aim is th u s brok en dow n to the following: * F irst to give a m ore precise definition o f th e rath e r vague concept o f " n a tu ra lism " ; * in the second place to give a sh o rt sketch o f tnc tw o m ost im p o rtan t representa tive p aradig m s o f n atu ralism an d an ti-n atu ralism respectively, i.e. logical positi vism an d K uhnian historicism ; an d * an d in the th ird place to discuss the m eaning o f " ratio n ality " as it is understood by these tw o schools.
WHAT IS NATURALISM?
In o rd er to clarify som e o f the m eanings o f th e concept I will introduce a threefold d istinction am o n g o n tological, epistem ological and m ethodological naturalism .
Ontological naturalism
A ccording to this thesis the n atu ral w orld is the only tru e w orld -It is Reality.
T he n o n -n a tu ra l (G o d , spirit, m ind, idea, etc.) is either seen as ap p aren t realities or reduced to categories in the n atu ral w orld. T he distinctive feature o f the thesis of ontological naturalism is its m onistic ch aracter. A ccording to one o f its exponents th e n a tu ra list opposes an y dualism betw een N atu re a n d A rt o r N atu ral and S u p ern atu ral 01 betw een N atu ral an d T ran scen d en tal1. T h e basic assum ption of this thesis is therefore th a t there is an unbreakable unity in the natural world.
Epistemological naturalism
T his thesis can be stated as follow s: T he n atu ra l w orld is either the best o r the only know able world. T he epistem ological n atu ralist has an unqualified belief th at true an d certain know ledge o f this n atu ral w orld is w ithin m an's reach. The reason for th is belief becom es clearer w hen one analyses th eir view o f the relation between m an an d nature.
F irst o f all, the natural o rd er is seen as the given, a p p aren t world. Invisible, im m aterial o r spiritual phenom ena over and above this given reality do not exist. Secondly, it is assum ed th a t this given reality has its ow n intrinsic structurew hich is o f necessity good. A ny m ental construct by m an m ust therefore aim to be as tru th fu l as possible. P ra tt w rites o n this issue th at N ature has a character o f its ow n, a n d " o u r opinions are true only in so far as they conform to this actual situ a tio n " 2.
T his has the im plication th at m an's role in the w hole process o f know ing is rath er passive. O u r m ental constructs o f reality are a t m ost representations, pictures, im pressions o r im ages o f reality. M an as know er is no t allow ed to im press his form on the n atu ral w orld -N ature puts its stam p on the hum an mind!
In the final instance it is ju s t this w hole passivist attitu d e th at guarantees the truth o r certainty q f o u r knowledge. If m an abides by the laws o f N ature (which are accepted as being unchanging an d therefore universally valid), true and certain know ledge is possible. T he only obstacle o n the ro ad to T ru th , is th at m an, more often than no t, in terp re ts these natural laws w rongly, i.e. o u r m ental constructs are not tru th fu l rep resentatio n s o f reality. T his is then usually ascribed to some subjective " interference" on the p a rt o f m an -factors like personal bias, prejudice, values an d em otions. Thus: T ru th is m anifest and attainable by m an, but only if m an is objective and neutral in his ap p ro ach to reality3.
M ethodological naturalism
In the third instance we find n aturalism defending the view th at this n atural order can only truly be know n th ro u g h the o p eratio n o f the scientific m ethod. The scientific m ethod com es to be recognized as the only instrum ent by which truthful know ledge o f reality can be reached. U sually this m ethod is identified with some stringent and form al logical rules o f inference, be they inductive or deductive. The im p o rta n t p oin t to m ake is th a t the scientific m ethod m ust be a m echanical p rocedure -non-subjective and therefore not prone to hum an fallibility -so as to ensure objective knowledge.
Sum m ary N atu ralism tak es its p o in t o f d ep a rtu re in th e assu m ptio n th a t the n atu ral ord er constitutes a m onistic and un b reakable unity. Because o f this assum ption (w hich characterizes all natu ralistic philosophies from Bacon to logical positivism ), the ideal has alw ays been th a t this n a tu ral unity should be m irrored in any hum an (m en tal) reco n stru ctio n o f this n atu ral order. Because it is fu rther assum ed th at this o rd e r is inherently good, men should at all tim es con fo rm to this o rd e r and no t vice In accordance w ith the thesis o f epistem ological natu ralism it is accepted th a t these P rotocol sentences are acceptable because they are only the sym bolic representation o f w hat has been given o r received in observation. " T h a t know ledge o f the w orld is possible rests n o t on h um an reason im pressing its form o n the m aterial, b u t o n the m aterial being ordered in a certain w ay." ' T hus. T he credibility o f th e fo un datio n al sentences is guaranteed throu gh its em pirical reference. U pon this fo u nd atio n a superstructure o f theoretical sentences is erected. A gain, in the spirit o f m ethodological n aturalism , th e credibility o f these high-level th eoretical sentences is gu aran teed th ro u g h their reduction to the fo u n d atio n al sentences. " Since the m eaning o f every statem ent o f science m ust be statab le by reductio n to statem ent a b o u t the given, likewise the m eaning o f any concep t, w hatever branch o f science it m ay belong te , m ust be statab le by stepwise reduction to o th er concepts, dow n to the concepts o f th e lowest level which refer directly to the given" 7.
It is interesting to note th a t the fu rth er developm ents after 1929 m ore or less focussed o n these tw o aspects o f the natu ralistic, and th erefore the positivist, position. O n the one h an d there w as the problem o f th e relation betw een the b asic/fo u n d a tio n al o r P rotocol sentences and the em pirical given.
O n the o th e r h an d there was the problem o f the gap betw een P rotocol sentences an d the high-level theoretical superstructure. A lready in the early thirties there was a long debate betw een C arn a p and N eu rath concerning the first issue, i.e. w hether th e P rotoco l sentences should be u n dersto od in a phenom enalistic o r physicalist sense. T he o th e r p roblem was first given serious a tten tio n in 1936 when C arn ap , in his " T estability and M eaning" changed the criterion o f verification to a confirm ation-criterion. Since then there have been tw o m ain developm ents concerning this very problem ; the one was C arn ap 's program m e o f an inductive logic; the o th er the atte m p t by the Bayesians like Salm on, H esse an d Maxwell, to interpret con firm ation n o t so m uch as a logical fu nction , b u t m uch m ore as a function o f perso nal belief o r credence. It can be safely stated to day th a t b o th these attem pts have proved to be futile.
I now proceed to discuss K u h n 's philosophical position very briefly.
Since K u h n a p p eared on the scene in the early sixties an d brought a b o u t a revolution in the philosophy ot science in his ow n way, it has been a favourite topic in philosophy o f science jo u rn a ls to try and find the real com m on factor in the so-called " new philosophy o f science" , i.e. " W hat is the com m on den om inato r in the w orks o f people like H an so n , T ou lm in, F eyerabend, Polanyi, K uhn and even people like the later W ittgenstein?" . T he appearan ce o f some anom alies, i.e. theoretical and observational discrepancies which can 't be explained by the existing parad ig m , usually heralds the rise o f a new paradigm . Because o f the all-pervasive influence o f a paradigm , it is u n d erstand able th at the replacem ent o f one paradigm by a new one, is sketched as a scientific revolution. T h is leads K uhn to m ake the conclusion th a t tw o successive paradigm s are essentially incom patible.
Because K uh n's philosophy is very w ell-know n tod ay , this sh ort exposition will suffice8. It rem ains for me, how ever, to show in w hat ways K uhn can be described as an anti-naturalist.
T he first thesis o f naturalism , i.e. ontological n aturalism , im plies th a t there is only one, unchanging, uniform , n atu ral w orld. A lthough I could n o t find any reference in the w orks by K uhn to the ontological statu s o f the n atu ral w orld, it is, how ever, possible to infer the follow ing from his p osition. Because every p arad ig m d eterm ines my percep tion o f the n atu ral o rd er, every new paradigm does im ply a new an d different " perceived reality " . T his philosophical position prob ably comes nearest to th a t o f an o th er earlier a n ti-n atu ralist, i.e. Im m anuel K ant with his distinction betw een a phenom enal and noum enal world.
This h is the second im plication th at K uhn inadvertently also rejects the thesis of epistem ological naturalism . Because K uhn lends priority to the paradigm in the relation between paradigm and n ature in the sense that the paradigm determ ines o ne's perception o f the w orld, one's selection o f d a ta, the criteria one accepts in problem -solving, etc., one could say th at the paradigm constitutes a new concep tual world.
In T he m ost im portant o f K uh n 's critiques o f positivism can, however, be found in his rejection o f the thesis o f m ethodological naturalism . As you will rem em ber this thesis am o u nts to the belief that the scientific m ethod is the only instrum ent throu gh which true and certain know ledge o f reality can be searched. The other im p o rtan t point th a t we m ade was th at the scientific m ethod is usually seen as a m echanical procedure whereby scientific and non-scientific knowledge can be dem arcated. A lready on the th ird page o f T SO SR , K uhn rem arks th a t one o f the results o f his historical study is to show , and I q uote, " The insufficiency of m ethodological directives, by them selves, to dictate a unique substantive conclu sion to many sorts of scientific q u estion s''12. In an o th er article he writes that " T here can be no set o f rules o f choice adequate to dictate desired individual beh aviou r in the concrete cases th at scientists will meet in the course o f their r a r i^r c " 13 K uhn therefore explicitly rejects the positivist and also n aturalist ideal o f a strictly m echanical (o r logical) p rocedure w hich will decide as it w here on b ehalf o f the scientist betw een scientific an d non-scientific knowledge. A ccording to K uhn it is th e scientist's com m itm ent to certain paradigm atic values that helps him to choose acceptable scientific theories.
In conclusion, K u h n 's position is thus: Because o f the inverted relation between paradigm and changing reality, as well as the inner com plexity o f the paradigm 's stru ctu re, it is unrealistic to believe (like the positivists do) th a t an analysis o f the form al relation betw een theory an d evidence can give us an explanation o f why one theory is replaced by a new one. It is only when one takes in to consideration inter-paradigm atic relations a n d especially the paradigm -induced values that scientists accept in tim es o f theory-choice th a t one can get a b etter u nd erstanding of scientific evaluation.
RATIONALITY
T his brings me to my last an d final p o in t, i.e. th e m eaning o f rationality in the positivist an d K uhnian paradigm s.
Since the earliest philosophizing a b o u t problem s o f know ledge, the search for know ledge has been synonym ous w ith the search fo r infallible know ledge. The central role in philosophy o f the quest fo r infallibility is equally well illustrated by the persistent search fo r som e unequivocal fo u n d ation on which the edifice of know ledge can be built. We have exam ined the logical positivists' attem p t to take the em pirically given as the fo u n d atio n o f know ledge. It is, how ever, p ertin en t to take a closer look at the o th e r pillar o f know ledge in the positivists' program m e, i.e. the inference from the su p erstru ctu re to fo u n d atio n al sentences. We have seen earlier th a t an im p o rta n t im plication o f th e epistem ological natu ralist's p o in t of view is the elim ination o f all h u m an , an d by d efinitioin, subjective facto rs from the scientific process. T his aspect finds it m ost evident effect in the positivists's distinc tio n betw een the contexts o f discovery a n d justificatio n . By lim iting the legitim ate d o m ain o f th e philosophy o f science to the la tte r, the positivist was ju s t follow ing th e tra d itio n o f replacing fallible hum an judgem ent by a set o f algorithm s. I quote H a ro ld B row n to the effect th a t " T his ideal co n tro lled early logical positivist ideas o n th e verification o f theories, receiving its m ost extrem e expression in W ittgen stein's attem p t to reduce all p ro po sition s to tru th factions o f atom ic propositions. ... T h is p ro g ram m e has, we have seen, been ab an d o n ed an d replaced, am ong logical em piricists, by th e search fo r an inductive logic based on probability theory. A gain the project is to find an alo go rith m o n the basis o f w hich we can evaluate scientific theories, the assu m ptio n being th a t even if we can n o t prove the final tru th o f an hypothesis, we can pro d u ce a set o f rules w hich will allow us to determ ine the degree to w hich it has been confirm ed by th e available evidence" 14.
B row n th en m akes th e very relevant rem ark th a t " T he attem p t by logical em piricists to identify rationality w ith algorithm ic com putability is som ew hat stran ge, since it deem s ratio n al only those h um an acts which could in principle be carried o u t w ithout the presence o f a hum an being!" 15. If one takes B row n's arg u m en t to its logical conclusion it m eans th a t to be ratio n al in th e positivist's m eaning o f the w o rd, is to act no n -ratio n a lly (i.e. w ith o u t using y o u r mind). Brow n, how ever, takes an o th e r line: A ccording to him it is even, w ith all the algorithm s in the w orld, possible to act irration ally , in the positivists' sense o f the w ord. " T here are m any different directions in w hich the scientist can proceed in attem ptin g to deduce testable consequences from his hypothesis, each o f which may be strictly in accordance with a set o f algorithm s, b u t he has no algorithm for determ ing w hich line to pursue. A n inform ed judgem ent is required an d it is in m aking such judgem ents th a t we m ust rely on reason. As long as decisions can be carried o u t by m eans o f algorithm s, hum an intervention is not necessary, it is exactly when we have no effective p rocedures to guide us th a t we m ust tu rn to an inform ed, ratio nal hum an ju d g m ent" 16.
If we tu rn to K uhn now , we see th a t it is precisely because o f his historical survey of scientific theories th a t he cam e to reject the positivist concept o f rationality. Both he an d people like Feyerabend an d H olto n have conclusively show n, I think, that there is no clear, sim ple relation betw een the results c f experim ent o r observation an d scientific theories. Even in the sim plest, m ost straig h tfo rw ard instance, i.e. the case o f an observational result w hich con trad icts a theory, the practising scientist is n o t b o u n d autom atically to reject p a rt o f his theory. T he decision as to how a discrepancy betw een theory an d observ atio n is to be handled requires a judgem ent by scientists. T his, I take it, is the th ru st o f som e o f K u h n 's most-widely attack ed claim s, e.g. th a t such questions (o f theory choice) " can never be settled by logic and experim ent alone" and " the com petition betw een paradigm s is no t the sort of battle th at can be resolved by proofs" .
T o u n d erstan d K u h n 's concept o f ration ality b etter, Brow n suggests th a t one should com pare K uhn's position with A ristotle's m an o f practical wisdom as he is sketched in his Ethics. F o r A ristotle, ethics is concerned w ith hum an behaviour and because o f the com plexity o f hum an behaviour, there are no first principles on the basis o f w hich to construct a science. Ethical decisions require deliberation, the ability to weigh inform ation and m ake decisions in cases in w hich there is no necessary knowledge. The conclusion is no t infallible an d there is no guarantee th at all adequately inform ed people w ho deliberate on an issue will reach the sam e decision, bu t this does n ot m ake the decision a rb itra ry o r irrational. While A ris to tle 's m an o f p ractical w isdom , i.e. th e m an w ho has had sufficient experience to u n d erstan d h u m an behav iou r an d has developed his ability to deliberate, offers a m odel o f individual ratio nality , K uhn uses, I th in k , basically the sam e m odel o f ratio nality -only on the level o f the com m unity o f scientists. In a well-known statem ent K uhn gives a description o f the process o f com m unal deliberation: " T ake a group o f the ablest available people with the m ost ap p ro p riate m otivation; train them in som e science an d in the specialities relevant to the choice at hand; im bue them with the value system, the ideology, current in their discipline and, finally, let them m ake the choice" 17.
B row n concludes th a t " It is the consensus o f the w orkers in a discipline th at d eterm ines w hat co n stitu tes know ledge in this discipline, b u t th e gro up m ay later d iscover th a t it m ade a m istake. T h e g ro u p is no m ore infallible th a n the individual (b u t this does n o t m ean th a t it is as fallible as the individual" " .
It sh o u ld be evident by now in w hat w ay K u h n 's concept o f ratio n ality is also the result o f his p articu lar an ti-naturalistic p o in t o f view.
Because K uhn rejects th e m ain thesis o f natu ralism , and proceeds o n the basis o f th e p rio rity o f som e th eo retical stru ctu re, i.e. a p arad ig m , it could be interp reted in a negative way, as a restrictio n o f scientist's activities. Scientists' w hole perceptual, con ceptual a n d even sem antic m ake-up is already laid dow n by th e paradigm to w hich they are co m m itted. If one looks a t it, how ever, from the po in t o f view of decision-m aking, th e adherence to a parad igm seem s to becom e m ore a n d m ore a ttractiv e. Because a paradigm dictates certain ways o f doing things, because a p arad ig m provides com m on criteria an d values th a t can be utilised in tim es of crisis, th e possibility o f consensus is so m uch g reater. T he reason why grou p decisions th ro u g h o u t the history o f science, seem to be relatively unanim ou s can then be und ersto o d as a function o f the paradigm s th a t scientists adhered to.
In conclusion I th in k th a t the m ain lesson to be learned, can be found in the trad itio n o f W estern Philosophy to identify know ledge with infallibility an d truth.
If one accepts know ledge to be reasonable o r even ju stified belief, it does no t entail th e fu rth e r thesis, i.e. th a t know ledge should necessarily be true an d infallible. W hat co u n ts as a reaso n ab le belief will certainly differ from tim e to tim e, a n d from con text to context If this is seen as relativism , then all hum an know ledge will be relativistic.
